

**MEDIA POLICY AND THE PRIORITIZATION OF SOCIAL VALUES:
INTENTIONS VERSUS IMPLEMENTATIONS**

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Abstract

This study examines the gap between the intentions of the Israeli legislature to harness the privatization of television for the prioritizing of social values and the implementations of those intentions by senior executives in Israeli commercial television. Comparison between the expectations of the legislature and the conduct of the industry's executives showed that both the legislators and the media executives in Israel assigned greater importance to internal social values target than to external/global ones. However, despite of steps taken by the franchisees to promote social values and cultural developments, Israeli multi-channel television as well as Israel commercial television is lagging in fulfillment of these aims.

Key words: media policy, social change, hegemony, civil society, multi-channel TV

The mass media are one of the most dominant forces where assimilation and application of social values are concerned. Their power is expressed through the symbolic significance they assign to the social order (Schubert, 2006; Trevino, 2005), to social identity (Ragusa, 2005), and to social perceptions (Durfee, 2006). Media coverage of social values can relate to a number of possible aspects: change sought by the state, such as formulating a policy for immigration and secure borders (Orfali, 2006), promoting health (Bergsma, 2004), and so on; changes sought by a political party, such as the extreme right (Charteris-Black, 2006); social changes sought by NGOs (Singhal and Rattine- Flaherty, 2006), and so on. The choice of topic and content to be covered often reflects the media policy current locally, that is, media involvement in the processes of social change are the outcome of the legislators' and regulators' concept of the media's place in these processes. This study therefore examines the elements of prioritizing social values via media policy underlying the actions of multi channel and commercial television in Israel. This is done by analyzing the language of the laws and regulations formulated in the 1980s by the Israeli legislation. After studying the legislators' and regulators' concepts, the study examines how senior media executives conceive of their part in prorotizing social values. Finally, the gap between the legislation's idea of commercial and multi channel television and that of senior executives in the media industry is examined. Focusing on this gap may help us understand what goes on "behind the scenes" with respect to the kind and quality of the coverage given to moves for social change.

1. MEDIA POLICY

The development of the media sector has always depended on a number of factors: political, social, cultural, economic, and technological, among others (Hoffmann-Riem, 1996). A long-standing, traditional concept is that monopolistic state regulation is the best solution to the regulation of broadcasting (Scannell, 1996). The state has justified its attempts to influence the media by arguing that doing so is in the public interest (Raboy et al. 2003). However, in recent years we have seen a radical change in the way that media institutional bodies are organized. The blurring of boundaries in

the world of technology makes traditional distinctions irrelevant. In the absence of clearly drawn dividing lines, regulatory rules lose their practical significance. Although national political systems still play an important part in the regulation and guidance of national media all over Europe, and in other countries throughout the world, national regulatory structures for the media are getting weaker.

According to the ethos of TV broadcasting, it provides a service that no self-respecting regime can be without (Barnett, 1991). As a result, politicians are certainly convinced — although not always with good reason (Nossiter, 1991) — that TV has enormous power. This explains the monopoly on TV broadcasting which operated, according to the particular rules of each one, in most Western European countries, and it remained in government hands for a very long time. But all over the world established structures in broadcasting systems are undergoing change (Collins, 1994). The speed of technological developments in the 1980s did much to reshape the national media and change the agenda of the communications industry (Siune et al. 1986). All efforts were directed toward making cheaper communication technologies available, a development that was expected to open the door to deregulation, privatization, more communications satellites, and to end the age of the monolithic national communications policy (Siune et al. 1992).

Whereas technology was the catalyst for structural change in the media in the mid-1980s, today economic forces play a much more significant role. Finance has become the factor that determines the limits of what is possible and profitable, and the general financial infrastructure has begun to mesh with the financial infrastructure of telecommunications (Van Cuilenburg and Slaa, 1993). Market forces exercise a growing influence and have, in fact, become dominant in areas that were totally regulated by the regime in the past (Siune et al. 1992). Progressive nations have therefore begun in the last few years to re-examine the structure of the communications industry, and the institutions operating within it. The objectives of communications policy are in the process of redefinition in the United States, the EU, Japan, Scandinavia, East Asia, and many other countries. Legislation concerning the communications industry is being revised; new institutions are being set up, whereas others are disappearing; licensing formulas and supervisory procedures for the industry are changing significantly (Boaz et al. 1996). This being the case, it is clear that nowadays media policy refers to all factors that influence the media, not only the state. The terrain of media policy has become a battleground, a field of tension and struggle (Raboy, 2007). In the United States and Western Europe three paradigmatic phases of communications and media policy may be distinguished: the paradigm of an emerging communications industry policy (up until World War II); the paradigm of a public service media policy (1945-1980/90); and the current phase (from 1980/90 onward) in which a new policy paradigm is sought (Van Cuilenburg and McQuail, 2003). In this phase, the distinctive features of broadcast licenses as a form of soft property and the significance of property settlements are often decisive factors in the relationship between private ownership and public interest (Flew, 2006).

Studies that examine the connection between media and policy often neglect to fully explore the dynamic nature of this association over time (Yanovitzky, 2002). The current study tries to evaluate Israeli media policy in regard to the tasks of prioritizing social and cultural values, and then to estimate the assimilation of these developmental tasks by the Israeli media industry. A comparative analysis of media laws and regulations and their expression in the media industry will help us determine if multi channel and commercial TV in Israel have reinforced the hegemonic centers, or rather strengthened Israeli civil society.

2. HEGEMONIC CENTERS AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Social policy is very often shaped by the ideology current in the hegemonic centers of a society. Hegemony has been understood primarily as a form of ideological domination. It is constructed at the

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national level (Wiley, 2006), but its influence over identities does not require homeland attendance (Chan, 2005; Mallapragada, 2006). Gramsci (1971) defined hegemony as the leadership position of a group or class in society, created by means of an alliance, or cooperation, between those who control the means of production and the originators and representatives of ideas and ideologies. Hegemony is the ruler's cultural leadership. It is a complicated inter-meshing of forces of a political, social, and cultural nature (Berger, 2005). A hegemonic center needs to have an ideological-cultural influence to promulgate its interests, until they come to be perceived as those of society as a whole. Ideological-cultural influence is achieved by operating in the social and cultural spheres, mostly through the mass media (Frau-Meigs, 2006; Fung, 2007; Wojcieszak, 2007).

The media tend to mirror the hegemonic characteristics of the dominant discourse (Frosh and Wolfsfeld, 2007; Holling, 2006; Ku, 2007;), and restrain non hegemonic or counter-hegemonic discourse in subtle ways (Von der Lippe, 2006). But mass media can also resist the ideological hegemony and produce alternative interpretations (Alozie, 2006; Ashley, 2006; Atkinson, 2006). In a time of radical changes in the political, economic, and global spheres, traditional hegemonic centers are losing their cultural and ethical supremacy. The role of the media is being redefined, while academics attempt to expand Gramsci's ideas regarding political hegemony to cover global and economic hegemony as well (Ashley, 2006; Bradley 2005; Hoek, 2005; Purcell, 2005; Siber, 2005; Simpson, 2004).

Attempts to cope with a situation full of destabilizing tensions encourage formation of a civil society. Civil society's distinguishing features are that it values heterogeneity and puts limits on the harmful effects of political power (Hall, 1995) via non government institutions strong enough to counterbalance the state's power (Gellner, 1995). The importance of creating a civil society is widely accepted (Habermas, 1989; Hall, 1995; Mukerjee and Schudson, 1991; Rantanen, 1996; and others). But the expansion of civil society goes hand in hand, according to Gramsci, with advanced capitalism and the state. Moreover, civil society collaborates with the state to contain conflict, and at the same time promote class struggle (Burawoy, 2003). In this framework, a principal condition for winning power is to exercise leadership within civil society (Harris, 2007), gaining government support (Bleich, 2007) and balancing the needs of the market with those of an 'empowered' public (Livingstone and Lunt, 2007). The result is commercialized media, offering a narrower range of viewpoints, as evidenced by less representation of civil society (Benson and Hallin, 2007). The strong connection between culture and the shaping of political attitudes (Almond, 1980; Almond and Verba, 1963), ideology, and values is likely to wane without the hegemonic centers incentive. Unless peripheral citizen groups are given new orientation there is no foundation for a civil society. Therefore, the renewal of interest in civil society in the 1990s can be interpreted as a sign of weariness with and lack of faith in our social order (Giner, 1995), or as a historical experiment, no longer relevant to the times (Perez-Diaz, 1995).

This weariness and/or lack of faith in our social order expose deep structural changes in the distribution of power. Development communication theory has different perspectives of power within the process of social change (Cadiz, 2005; Hemer and Tufte, 2005; Waisbord, 2005; Wilkins, 2000). Participatory approaches to prioritizing social values draws attention to the power of local communities to recognize and resolve social concerns (Wilkins, 2000). It stresses the importance of local communities' cultural identity and of democratization and participation at all levels — international, national, local, and individual (Cadiz, 2005; Servaes, 1996). There are two major approaches to participatory communication that everybody currently accepts as common sense. The first is dialogical pedagogy, and the second involves the ideas of access, participation, and self-management articulated by Servaes and Malikhao (2005). However, the focus on community empowerment should not lead us to underestimate the role of governments. A government decision to prioritize a given issue substantially affects the prospects of development work (Waisbord, 2005).

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Hence, this study examines the Israeli legislature's intentions to harness the privatization of television for the development of civil society and its ability to impose those intentions.

3. METHODOLOGY

Research hypothesis - the present research is based on the hypothesis that there are in Israel independent, voluntary organizations composed of autonomous groups trying to provide a counterweight to the state and limit its political power. Although there are differences of opinion about the extent of the public sphere's influence and dominance (Barzilai, 1992; Ben-Eliezer, 1996; Kimmerling, 1985, 1995; Liebman, 1989; Shapira, 1996 and others), there is no doubt that organized groups of citizens are continuing to form and trying to change political decisions. This is evidence that the political hegemonic center is losing strength and civil society is gaining it (Lehman-Wilzig, 1992; Lehman-Wilzig and Kurz, 1994).

Up to the 1990s, the policy in Israel with regard to TV broadcasting was to favor public discourse in the arena of public television only. Comparable to the council fire of tribal elders, it often acted as an agent of national consolidation and identity (Katz, 1973; Levinson, 1979, 1981; Levinson and Adoni, 1991; and others). Television monopoly served as a socializing agent to ensure the dissemination of the ideas and interests of the ruling hegemony. Obviously, breaking that monopoly, and transition to a multi channel TV system, were perceived as an existential threat to the culture-disseminating apparatus of the hegemonic centers. Transition to commercial broadcasting is bound to strengthen peripheral civil groups.

The Research Questions - the Israeli legislature expected that privatization of television would, through the broadcasting franchisees, boost social development and strengthen civil society. Were these expectations assimilated, and to what extent?

Research Field - examining the gap between the intentions of the Israeli legislature to harness the privatization of television for the development of civil society and the application of those intentions by senior executives in Israeli commercial television means analyzing structural changes in the Israeli media industry. Therefore, the study begins with mapping and charting the legislators' regulatory policy and continues with structural analysis of that policy's implementation.

The comparative nature of this study (legislators' expectations compared to TV franchisees' conduct) requires a research field with a dual focus. Two foci were therefore defined: the field concerned with the legislators' expectations was defined as a formal field consisting of recommendations by the various committees set up to discuss the privatization of TV broadcasting, and the clauses of the law laid down in accordance; the field concerned with assimilation of these expectations was defined as a media field dealing with the insider debates about them that took place amongst the media industry's chief executives.

The data used to analyze the regulators' expectations was material on groups and ideas in civil society as it appears in arguments and recommendations presented by the government-appointed Committees of Inquiry to establish desirable media models (Bar-Sela et al. 1982; Kuberski et al. 1979); laws regulating the operation of the broadcasting authorities and their broadcasts (Reshumot Laws, 13.8.86, 20.2.90); and compilations of regulations for tenders, granting franchises, and determining the regulations and specifications for the franchisees' programs (Karniel, 1983; Reshumot Regulations, 12.11.87a, 12.11.87b, 12.11.87c, 12.11.87d, 12.11.87e;). The material analyzed in this field consists of two laws regulating multi channel and commercial television in Israel; five ordinances regulating television broadcasts; and three reports from professional committees on media policy in Israel.

Examination of the extent to which the regulators' intentions were taken up was conducted by analyzing reports in Israel's elite press on meetings of top TV industry executives at what has come to be called "Rosh Pinna Festival". This has been an annual event since 2000, at which senior TV executives meet in the village of Rosh Pinna for a weekend of discussions and meetings. These discussions take place "far from the conference rooms, the Knesset's Financial Committee, and court house corridors" (<http://www.tvfestival.co.il/Tvasp?ID=21>). The festival's initiator was Ami Genigar, a prominent Israeli TV tycoon; its funding comes from sponsors. The rationale for choosing to focus on Israel's elite press for reports on the festival was that an elite print newspaper is inextricably bound up with the social elite, and thus committed to supporting the existing social structure (Gitlin, 2003). By mobilizing the public in support of the elite's social interests, the media serve as a hegemonic agent whipping up support for government views (Gramsci, 1971; Izadi and Saghaye-Biria, 2007). This can be done using one or more of the following techniques: creating an index whereby publication of news stories in the media is limited to topics of interest to the elite (Bennett, 1990); adherence to procedure rather than to essence (Entman, 2004); restrictions on media criticism of the elite (Bennett, 1990; Billeaudeau, Domke, Hutcheson and Garland, 2003; Entman, 1991, 2004; Lee, 2003); and concealment of the multiple facets of the topic being reported (Crawley, 2007). If the elite press is committed to representing the interests of the social elite, it is an apt field for analyzing the extent to which the legislation's expectations have been taken up by top media executives.

Two elite daily papers are published in Israel: *Haaretz* (with its financial section, *The Marker*) and *Globes*. Between 2000-2007 they published a total of 121 articles on the Rosh Pinna Festival. The articles were traced by searching their archives, using the reference unit: "Rosh Pinna Festival".

Time span - investigation of the regulators' intentions covered the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. Investigation of the extent to which these intentions were assimilated by the media industry covered the years 2000-2007. The choice of two different time-spans was dictated by the dual-focus nature of the study and is intended to allow a long-term examination of the assimilation process.

Research method - the first stage of this study was to locate and collect those of the committees' recommendations to the legislature, and those clauses of the law, that encourage commercial television as part of prioritizing social values and civil empowerment in Israeli society. The various clauses in the recommendations were classified according to the type of social values and civil empowerment inherent in them.

According to Strauss and Corbin (1990), the initial stage in analyzing the data is a relatively open system of coding. At this initial stage of analysis, phenomena are organized into categories, and names or representation themes are assigned to the categories, using terms derived directly from the data. The analysis is linked to the specific context of the data (Pidgeon and Henwood, 1996). Once the data have been broadly categorized, the analysis can proceed to the mapping stage (Araujo, 1995; Dey, 1993).

The second stage of the study was to locate and collect reports in Israel's elite press on meetings of top executives in the Israeli TV industry in the course of the Rosh Pinna Festival. The content of the reports was classified according to the type of social values and civil empowerment identified in Stage One. The difference between the legislation's intentions and hopes and what the industry actually did in practice was then studied.

The second stage of the analysis is mapping (Shkedi, 2004). Whereas during the first stage each one of the data investigated is sorted into categories separately, in the context of a shared conceptual perspective, of course, in the mapping stage, all the data being examined are sorted into correlated categories (Shkedi, 2004), that is, we try to create links between the categories created so far (Pidgeon and Henwood, 1996). Strauss and Corbin (1990) define sub categories as dependents of the main categories. Mapping analysis ensures that the main category, or categories, chosen are the most apt,

based on a truly deep acquaintance with the data (Riessman, 1993). Classification is limited to such categories as have meaningful affinities with this main one, to keep the categorization process focused (Geertz, 1973). The product of the focused stage of analysis in this study will enable comparison between the intention of the regulator to encourage and foster social values through TV broadcasts and the execution of this intention by the Israeli media industry.

4. FINDINGS

4.1 Step 1 - charting the legislators' regulatory policy

After analyzing the wording of the law and the regulatory recommendations, it was found that two objectives were aimed at in the development of Israeli society: an internal-local one, and an external-global one. The first included four secondary objectives to be promoted: democratic processes, economic progress, cultural development; and social development. The second included two objectives to be promoted: technological development and cultural development.

4.1.1 Objective for internal (local) development

Promoting democratization: The policy for commercial TV aimed: **first**, to restrict attempts to exert political influence by interdiction of party propaganda in broadcasts, and by separating TV broadcasting from promotion of party interests;ⁱ **second**, to boost the public's ability to influence the contents of the programs;ⁱⁱ **third**, TV to widen Israeli citizens' choice of information sources;ⁱⁱⁱ **fourth**, to strengthen the foundations of democracy in Israel.^{iv}

Promoting economic development: The policy for commercial TV aimed: **first**, to increase competitiveness;^v **second**, to encourage financial pluralism in the media by allowing more types of ownership and methods of financing, while encouraging a variety of financial models;^{vi} **third**, to prevent centralization;¹⁵ **fourth**, to encourage economic growth in.¹⁶

Promoting cultural development: The policy for commercial TV aimed: **first**, to encourage original Israeli and Hebrew creative work;¹⁷ **second**, to encourage local creativity and community productions;¹⁸ **third**, to foster cultural diversity in Israeli society.¹⁹

Promoting social development processes: The policy for commercial TV aimed: **first** to bring the inhabitants of development towns into closer contact with events in their region;²⁰ **second**, to give expression to community life and strengthen the citizen's ties with the local authority;²¹ **third**, to provide a platform in response to the needs of religious and ultra-orthodox elements;²² **fourth**, to

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provide programs for linguistic peripheral groups in their language and speech;^{vii} *fifth*, to provide a vehicle of expression for national peripheral groups in Israel.^{viii}

4.1.2 Objective for external (global) development

Promoting technological development: The policy for commercial TV aimed *first*, to encourage Israel to join the new, international technological/economic era;^{ix} *second*, to encourage the installation of advanced mass-media systems.

Promoting cultural development: The policy for commercial TV aimed *first*, at a process of cultural rapprochement which would enable Israel to be part of the “global village”;^x *second*, to open up the media to global channels and strengthen Israel’s ties with states in the region, and with other states.^{xi}

4.2 Step 2 - implementation of the legislature’s regulatory policy

4.2.1 Objective for internal (local) development

Promoting democratization: The aspect of the media policy concerned with democratization of broadcasting demanded, as a means of reducing political influence on the media, prevention of party political broadcasts and/or promotion of party interests. In TV broadcasting the media industry is not, in practice, concerned with program content as an expression of party political interests, but it is concerned with strengthening the connection between capital and government. Media people are affected by the fact that they rub up against politicians and make their living from periodic work with them. At the first television and movie festival in December 2000, for instance, leaks were reported according to which the chief executive of one of the franchisees was censoring political skits in their trial shooting stage for a political satire program (Weiss, 2000). In 2002, the festival took place in the shadow of the political crisis in Israel; many of the participants in the festival also make their living from “seasonal work in the political campaigns of elections” (Vardi, 2002). Consequently, the former Prime Minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, became: *The most intriguing speaker in Rosh Pinna Festival. This was an opportunity for Netanyahu to reconcile with and cosy up to hundreds of media people who were present. Netanyahu declared that he would open the media up to a regime of licenses. ‘If it was up to me, I’d throw out all tenders and give out licenses for a hundred dollars, sorry, for a hundred shekels, to anyone who applied.’ Immediately after that he suggested copying the basic plan of the American electronic media industry in Israel. This touched on the sorest spot of the audience there, but appealed to the hearts of the big franchisees-the chief shareholders of Channel 2. He was addressing them, and only them. He was appeasing them- and only them.* (Vardi, 2002)

On the same occasion Netanyahu repeated that he does not believe in the Prime Minister’s Office having control over the Broadcasting Authority, as he proved by not appointing one of his own people to the public channel. Here, Yair Stern, who was head of Channel 1 at the time, could not help interrupting from the floor with a reminder that it was Netanyahu himself who, immediately after he was elected, transferred the Broadcasting Authority to his office (Kroll, 2002b). The fact that the ex-Prime Minister was invited to the festival, and that he addressed the big concessionaires, shows that the attempt to shape a media policy “cleans” of politics and party political interests cannot be reconciled with the overall interests of the media industry, and has therefore not been applied.

A policy of fostering democracy in broadcasting also demanded more unfettered sources of information for the benefit of Israel’s population. But intentions are one thing, reality another. At the fourth Rosh Pinna Festival, which took place between October 30, 2003 and November 1, 2003, the Second Broadcasting Authority announced that current events were not occupying enough time and suggested “establishing a quota for current events program at the level of at least one weekly program” (Kroll, 2003). In other words, not even the least and most basic level of one program a week has been settled on. If we consider in addition that there is no mention at all of expanding the public’s ability to

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have its say on program content, and no mention at all of what commercial television does to strengthen the country's democratic foundations, what we have is almost total rejection by the industry of the legislature's intention for commercial television to be a tool for democratization.

Promoting economic development: To promote a process of economic growth, the investigative committees charged with formulating a media policy recommended taking steps toward a competitive system. Various clauses in the laws were formulated to encourage pluralism in ownership systems and multiple financial models, and to prevent financial centralization. However, the broadcasting franchisees, contrary to the intentions of the advisory experts and the legislators, are actually using the means put at their disposal to try and block competition. At the *Rosh Pinna Festival* for Television and Movies that took place in November 2001, according to newspaper reports, the talk was about problems such as Channel 2's franchisees warning of the catastrophe "in the shape of the new commercial channel threatening to skim the cream off the advertising cake, which had hitherto been exclusively theirs" (Hirsch, 2001). A year later, at the 2002 festival, the preparations of the commercial TV franchisees for entering into competition with the rising Russian-language channel were already on open display. As part of this preparation, ideas for converting Hebrew-language program into Russian were revealed, the idea being to make the Russian-language channel superfluous and hang on to the "Russian" viewer ["It was revealed that the Channel 2 franchisees are getting ready for competition with the Russian channel, and are currently discussing the transmission of their programmes with a Russian voice-over" (Kroll, 2002a).] A further example of the franchisees' attempt to prevent any moves encouraging competition is the declaration of Channel 2 franchisees that too many channels are being created, and the advertising cake is not big enough to go round: "In the competition between Channel 2 and Channel 10, Channel 2 lost "6% – 8% of the advertising cake. This is the cream on the cake, the margin of difference that allows us to do dramas. From now on, we'll be crying" (Kroll, 2002a).

Altogether, the central topic at the third festival that year (2002) was money: "there was no getting away from it, the question of money came up in all the discussions, even those that weren't officially about the crisis. Everybody's making a loss, everybody's complaining non-stop. The industry is in trouble the TV market in Israel is losing two milliard shekels this year, that's the total lost by the cable company, the satellite company, and Channel 10" (Kroll, 2002a). Therefore, we can conclude that, whereas the legislature and the regulators meant commercial television to help along the process of economic development, the franchisees of commercial broadcasting in fact create the impression that this move failed, that the television channels are losing money, and the industry is in trouble.

Promoting cultural development: In order to promote a process of cultural development, the various relevant statutes determined that television must promote original Hebrew and Israeli program, local and community program, in short, every variety of Israeli cultural creation. However, creation and cultural development require money, and already at the 2001 Rosh Pinna Festival, among the problems brought up was the effect of the broadcasting concessionaires' growing losses on their ability to produce original dramas (Ayalon, 2001). It also becomes clear that, even before program creation is addressed, the Israeli TV industry is short of representation of the subcultures active in Israel. For example, different creators of television took part in the Television and Movie Festival held in 2002, but absent was "representation of most of the sub cultures existing in Israel" (Zucker, 2002). The community of producers therefore acts as a homogenous group that has difficulty in understanding, or knowing anything about, anyone not sharing its cultural code. Thus the feeling arises that "television producers are a community that lives light years away from most of its customers, the viewers" (Zucker, 2002). It is thus hard to see: *how the mosaic of Israeli life can find expression if the decisions on the image of the TV screen are made — on almost all the channels, by all the franchisees, at all hours of the day — by a group whose cultural world does not contain the world of most of the citizens here. This is not a conspiracy to deny representation to most of the*

nation. This is not an evil plot of the elite conspiring to expel the religious, the mizrahi, the Arab and the Russian public from the centers of society's most significant cultural force. What we have here is a structure maintained for some decades now, and the fact is that it has scarcely opened its ranks to anyone who is not a member of the order. The human constituents and cultural profile of the electronic media's elite have hardly changed since the media came into being. (Zucker, 2002)

One year later, at the 2003 festival, the regulators brought up the problem of too many light entertainment program in prime time, as opposed to the few dealing with the social and geographical periphery (Kroll, 2003). Furthermore, the level of the prime-time program did meet the demands of the tender for commercial television. According to a report of the Second Broadcasting Authority, published in 2007, the commercial channels did meet most of their obligations to produce program with Israeli content: nevertheless, on the central subject of upper genre program: *Channel 2's concessionaires have a shortfall of 43m shekels between what they engaged to spend and what they actually did. Channel 10 falls short by 31.8m shekels expenditure, and ninety hours programming, mainly in drama (about 18.6 m shekels and 3 hours)* (Gaoni and Bein, 2007). From these examples, and many others, we can conclude that, despite steps taken by the franchisees to promote a process of cultural development, the broadcasts are still some way off from fulfilling this aim.

Promoting social development: In order to promote a process of social development, the statutes and rules regulating TV broadcasting, and the rules for franchise tenders, state that commercial and multi-channel television must bring the people in development towns in touch with what is happening in their area, reflect and strengthen community ties and the ties of the citizens to their local authority, serve as a platform for the needs of religious publics, and provide programmes for peripheral populations in their own language. However, the press coverage of the Rosh Pinna Festival indicates a serious shortfall in representation of the religious and national peripheral groups, and of the new immigrants, in the process of TV production: You couldn't find a religious person in television production for love or money. "Russian immigrants? There were three. Maybe four. As for a representative Sephardi or Arab- I didn't dare ask. There is a limit" (Zucker, 2002). When they do decide to address peripheral populations, such as the Russian immigrants, they treat such a channel as a niche product, not a mainstream one. The chief executive of the planned Russian channel, for instance, had *"also starred on a panel on niche channels, entitled 'A channel for every viewer' She claimed that her channel, which addresses the 17% of the population who have not as yet been given adequate attention on TV, is not a niche channel, but a mainstream channel for its target viewers"* (Kroll, 2002a). In the end, the regulators had to propose enlarging the *"programme quota for Israeli and Jewish culture to thirty-nine hours per channel per year, also establishing a quota for programmes about festivals and holy days and a quota for programmes for the peripheries was set at fifteen per concessionaire per year, with at least one single drama that features someone from the periphery with an important role in its production"* (Kroll, 2003). Needless to say, the concessionaires were in no hurry to adopt this solution.

4.2.2 Objective for external-global development

Promoting the process of technological development: Multi channel broadcasting was forged according to a concept of encouraging global technological development. However, in the first years of the 21 century Israel's TV industry scarcely related to the idea of TV broadcasting contributing to this process. There was no change in the traditional concept of TV broadcasting. From newspaper reports covering the *Rosh Pinna Festival of Television and Cinema*, one gets the sense that the programmers in Israel missed their opportunity to take significant steps into the Internet scene, and that they will likely miss the opportunity of getting into the cellular market as well. In 2006, the Internet was seen as a threat to TV broadcasting (Hadas, 2006). But Internet entrepreneurs, too, are still finding it hard to raise a fitting television project. In 2007, there was increased interest in the

question of television's future in an era of global technological development, and it is becoming one of the central questions that people are trying to answer at the festival. This is also the first time that a venture capital fund is participating in the conference and is even sponsoring it. The fund's spokesman explained: *there is a feeling that Israel harbours a storehouse of knowledge and talent, enough to build successful media and new-media companies. There are people with international experience here, who know about programs, and are going into the start-up game.* (Grimald, 17.10.2007)

He added that Israel must look at what is happening in other countries in order to mould the management of the media field.

Promoting cultural development: Although both legislators and regulators intended commercial and multi channel broadcasting to help bring Israel closer to the culture of the global village, and to strengthen Israel's connection to countries in the region, there is no evidence of any such intentions in the discussions among the top industry people at the Rosh Pinna Festival.

5. DISCUSSION

Communication for development of social values is a multifaceted, multidimensional, and participatory process through which people are empowered to control their own destinies (Servaes, 2007). But communication for development of social values needs the support of decision makers and policy makers (Servaes, 1999). Theories of communication for development of social values consider the lack of political, economic, and cultural power of lower-status sectors as the central problem to be addressed in development (White, 2004). In order to reshape the field of development of social values communication we must situate its discourse and practice within contexts of power (Wilkins, 2000). Hence, this article focuses on the gap between the intention of the legislation to harness the privatization of TV broadcasting to the task of developing civil society in Israel and the application of that intention by top management in Israel's TV industry.

The findings showed that there were two foci for the promotion of civil society in Israel: the internal/local axis and the external/global one. The first contained four sub objectives: democratization, financial values, cultural values, and social values. The second focus contained two sub objectives: technological development and cultural development. Taking these points one by one, we see that *first*, both the legislators and the heads of the media industry in Israel attach far more importance to internal than to external development. The legislation formulated 16 requirements for local social and civil values, and four for global social values. The Israeli media industry scarcely relates at all to the contribution of TV broadcasting to global technological development and totally disregards the legislators' intentions to promote the global cultural process. The gap between the legislation and the media industry on the implication of global technology and global culture is quite surprising. As the 21 century unfolds, a global framework for media policy is emerging. Although its outlines are not yet clear, the stakes are so great that any movers in the social sphere who ignore this framework do so at their peril (Raboy et al. 2003). Moreover, at a time of considerable change in the global media environment, when new actors and new paradigms are emerging, and the balance of power between public and private interests in the policy-making process is involved (Freedman, 2006), policy makers in Israel seem to be on focus where as media industry discussions appear to be out of touch. All over the world, media industries have made the media sector one of the most lucrative and important growth areas of global capitalism, and they do not hesitate to undertake the political activity necessary to promote their interests (in the media) (Raboy, 2007). Public communications online, it has been argued, generate civic cultures and organize civil societies (Norris, 2002). Forms of online activism seek to raise people's awareness and ultimately be used as a tool for social change (Fenton, 2008). During its conference, the media industry in Israel tended to ignore the

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potential of the new global arena and appeared to be trying to maximize profits from the old media system, disregarding the development of the global media arena.

Second, it was found that the legislators' aim for privatization of TV broadcasting in Israel to foster the prioritization of social values process by boosting democratization was almost completely rejected by the media industry. Power inequities, gaining control over democratic participation, are considered a central problem in communication for developing social values (Melkote and Steeves, 2001). Traditionally, media policy's main concerns are with freedom, diversity, quality of content, and public accountability. The main values associated with political affairs are those that support or are advanced by democratic political institutions. The primary value in this connection is that of freedom of expression and publication. The policy goal of universal provision is closely associated with equality. Participation in civic life also presumes shared and adequate access to information and ideas and the means to transmit and exchange these goods (Van Cuilenburg and McQuail, 2003). As stated earlier, findings suggest that the attempt to design a media policy that would promote democratization was rejected completely by the media industry. Perhaps, indeed, as Jakubowicz (2004) suggested, the belief that one can transplant institutions as part of a process of transformation is over optimistic.

Third, it was found that the concessionaires of commercial television tried to create the impression that the legislature failed in its attempt to ensure that privatization of TV broadcasting in Israel would promote steps to economic values. Although the process of media policy-making is skewed by the taken-for-granted domination of market ideology (Freedman, 2006), franchisees depict media regulators as anti-market elements. According to insider discourse, promoting competition will destroy the industry. The social democratic approach, according to which media policy should support greater market competition (Flew, 2006), is rejected in favour of seeking to maintain the existing broadcasting order. Nevertheless, Israeli media policy makers continue to encourage financial pluralism and to promote competition.

Fourth, it was found that although franchisees did take steps toward cultural development, the broadcasts are still a long way from meeting this goal. The national goal is to create a space in which cultural producers' relationships with institutions are structured to shape cultural product and consumption (Abramson, 2002). The Israeli media industry has implemented steps for promoting cultural creation, yet there is still a significant gap between media policy aims and media industry practice. Because the media play a significant role in the development and perception of identity (D'Haenens, 2003) and because a strong sense of local and regional cultural identity provides a basis for the deconstruction of the ideological hegemony of urban-technical elites (White, 2004), future investment in cultural development is necessary.

Fifth, it was found that in despite steps taken by broadcasting franchisees to encourage social development, the broadcasts are still a long way from meeting this goal. Social demand varies with the cultural context of media policy (Hanada, 2003), and even though we cannot easily distinguish between social and cultural policy goals, media policy promotes positive social and cultural objectives (Van Cuilenburg and McQuail, 2003). Still, it seems that in Israel promoting positive social and cultural objectives is open to negotiation. The Israeli media industry has accepted the dominant landscape of the majority unquestioningly and neglects that of minority groups. Israeli legislators' media policy tries to promote minority groups, whereas the Israeli media industry tends to ignore them.

Conclusion - the mass media are among the dominant factors in assimilation and implementation of social values. Yet, contrary to Gramsci's version of the strong connection between extensive development of civil society and the reinforcement of capitalism (Harris, 2007), contrary to the aims of the Israeli legislation, the Israeli media industry admits no commitment to the building of a stronger civil society. Just as there is need for government support in civil society (Bleich, 2007) there is a need

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for support from the media industry in the social sphere of civil society. Perhaps the time has come for the industry to collaborate with civil society's travails and help it construct itself.

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