DEMANDS OF AGENTS IN A PROBLEM OF DEGRESSIVELY PROPORTIONAL ALLOCATION OF GOODS
Published: 22 Aug 2017
Abstract: The Treaty of Lisbon validated the degressive proportionality principle as a rule of allocating seats in the European Parliament. The principle can be comprehended twofold. First, the sequence of values resulting from an actual allocation is required to satisfy this condition, whereas second, it suffices that the sequence before rounding to integers satisfies the condition. Evidently, the latter understanding significantly increases the number of feasible solutions. The paper deals with one of the aspects of the degressive allocation rule perceived in this way. It is about adjusting the demands of agents in such a manner that the proportional allocation rule can be directly applied.
Keywords: degressive proportionality, fair division, european parliament, voting
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