THE INEQUALITY IN SOCIETY AND A MULTIPOINT EXTENSION OF NASH BARGAINING PROBLEM
Radim Valenčík, Ondřej Černík
Pages: 221-232
Published: 29 Sep 2021
Views: 375
Downloads: 34
Abstract: We use the microeconomic model of supply and demand of financial resources and investment opportunities, in which each contract can be interpreted as a specific Nash bargaining problem, where payoffs are expressed as income from the use of investment opportunities. We identify and describe the phenomenon of investing in a social position. A player investing in a social position can achieve a payoff distribution that is an alternative to the game associated with solving the Nash bargaining problem. Subsequently, we consider games in which players can react to the choice of alternative, providing as a multipoint extension of the Nash bargaining problem. These reactions lead to numerous non-trivial tasks that we describe and interpret in terms of real problems associated with the distribution of social wealth. We analyze games of positional investments with retaliation, games of positional investment with repetition, and games associated with reforms that allow players to expand the area of potential investment opportunities.
Keywords: capital market, cooperative game, human capital, investment, nash bargaining problem, productive consumption economics, social inequality, social weal
Cite this article: Radim Valenčík, Ondřej Černík. THE INEQUALITY IN SOCIETY AND A MULTIPOINT EXTENSION OF NASH BARGAINING PROBLEM. Journal of International Scientific Publications: Economy & Business 15, 221-232 (2021). https://www.scientific-publications.net/en/article/1002245/
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